Since October 1966, Indonesia has witnessed rapid and farreaching economic changes which followed the similarly drastic and fundamental changes on the political scene in the year fol lowing the abortive political coup d'etat of 1 October 1965. While the results of such rapid economic changes are not dis cernible yet on the surface, it is anticipated that the institu tional and other changes which have taken and are taking place will gradually reshape the entire economic future of Indonesia.
the Acting President and comprising three subcouncils in the monetary, distribution and production fields. This council in its day to day operations is assisted by a braintrust consist ing of university professors to advise it on economic and polit ical matters.
For the layman, the most noticeable result of these changes has been the apparent success of the Government, especially in the first half of 1967, in its efforts to curb the inflation which, in 1965 and in the first part of 1966, assumed runaway proportions. This was accompanied by a comparatively successful stabilization of the rupiah exchange rate. These achievements were of course not easy. When the inflation rate was brought down from about 141 per cent in the first quarter of 1966 to about 35 per cent in the similar period of 1967, and further to 0.65 per cent in April 1967 and even to a slight decline of prices by 0.21 per cent in May 1967,2 there were understandably considerable signs of tension and dissatisfaction on the part of many. Inflation, which had almost become an institution dur ing 1961-1966, has benefited those who were able to gear their activities to it. These included speculative traders, compa nies which supplied construction and other materials to the huge projects of those days, companies which received cheap credits at far below market rates and cheap foreign exchange allocations, etc. It also includes, however, people who could supplement their incomes by small scale buying and selling of second hand goods , activities which have become unprofitable with the suc cess of the stabilization program and have gradually disappeared. Stabilization measures were also hurting government departments and ministries who were used to supplementary budgets far ex ceeding their original budgets but who are at present instructed to adhere to the original budget of 1967.
On the theoretical side, critics of the Government argue that in Indonesia, where the two prime movers of the economy are the public sector and the export sector, curbing of these vital sectors through a balanced budget and tight credit policy may bring about a recession and even a decline in the national in come. Some critics argue further that the present stabiliza tion policies, if carried to the extreme, will not create the conditions for subsequent rapid economic growth, especially if little or no attention is paid to rehabilization of infrastruc ture and the communications system, the ports and other physical prerequisites for rapid economic development.
In spite of these criticisms, the Government is determined to continue its program of stabilization and to emphasize the attack on inflation.
Runaway inflation, which had virtually become institutionalized in Indonesia, must be eliminated en tirely not only in its monetary manifestations but more importantly 2. Price index for Djakarta based on 62 commodities.
Biro Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of Statistics).
in its physical and psychological effects in the form of institu tions and attitudes geared to inflation. At the same time, the Government has deemed it necessary to permit some relaxation especially in its tight money policy, particularly after March 1967 . Although Indonesia1s inflation in 1965 and 1966 still as sumed far smaller proportions than in the China of 1949,4 an acceleration of the inflation rate was imminent if no measures were taken to counter it. This is because inflation "feeds" itself through psychological and other factors which accentuate the effects on prices of increasing money supply. This is clear ly demonstrated in Table 2 , which shows the relation between money supply and the price index. As inflation became worse in 1965 and the first quarter of 1966, the rise in the price level in every quarter exceeded the increase in the money supply. Thus the elasticity of price with respect to money supply, which is determined by psychological and other factors., became very large, or 5.38 in the first quarter of 1965. The effects of the 3 October 1966 stabilization measures are clearly evident on the table.
The Accelerating Pace of Inflation
Both monetary expansion and prices increased at a lower rate during the last quarter of 1966 and the first quarter of 1967.
The importance of qualitative factors in both China and Indonesia is evident from the fact that in both cases stabili zation measures were taken by a new government which came into power at a time of hyperinflation.
It is even more apparent in the case of Germany in 1923 when no such change in power occurred.
The monetary reform introduced in Germany in October 1923 to check the much more advanced stage of inflation than that in Indonesia could not wait for the creation of the condi tions for a monetary recovery, i.e., the solution of the repara tions question and the improvement of the economic and political situation.
Even Luther, the minister responsible for the decree, described it as the work of one "who builds a house, beginning with a roof."5 The success of the monetary reform came quite unexpectedly and was accompanied by a rapid re-establishment of the equilibrium of the national budget and by an appreciable improvement in living conditions. The "miracle of the rentenmark" became a common expression.
Actually, the "miracle of the rentenmark" was to a great extent the result of psychological factors. The stability of the rentenmark was not due to the possibility of converting the latter into mortgage securities which yielded a 5 per cent inter est in gold, well below the market rate of interest.
The dif ference between printing the word rentenmark on a piece of paper instead of the equivalent billion marks is purely psychological. At that time lack of confidence in the legal paper mark was such that "any piece of paper, however problematical its guar antee, on which was written fconstant value1 was accepted more willingly than the paper mark."6 In fact, while the money sup ply rose significantly in real terms, there was a continuous fall in the value of paper marks in circulation. The real shortage of paper money led to a rapid rise in the velocity of circula tion and to the apparently paradoxical result that it became easier to redeem paper money; few notes would have been presented for conversion to gold had the opportunity been given.
It was roughly comparable to inflation in
The same situation was apparent in Indonesia, as shown in Table 2 . While the money supply continued to rise at an acceler ating pace, real cash balances fell and the shortage of money was reflected in a general increase in interest rates.
In fact, the money supply in May 1967 was in real terms only 75 per cent of that in March 1963.
It must be noted that the German stabili zation of the exchange was not obtained by means of contraction, nor even by stopping the expansion of the circulation of legal currency.
On the contrary, the quantity of legal currency rose considerably.7 This phenomenon is not difficult to explain. The increased confidence in the paper money led to a decline in the velocity of circulation as consumers, producers and merchants ceased to be preoccupied with the necessity to reduce their cash balances to the minimum.
In the stabilization measures taken by the Government in Indonesia, it may be as important to im press upon the people the seriousness of the intention to balance the budget as it is actually to reduce the deficit and to re strict monetary expansion.
The Basis and Tools of Government Policy
The role of non-economic factors in the present program is apparent from the foregoing and the fundamental changes in the Indonesian economy could probably not have been accomplished without changes in the political climate. The present Govern ment was formed immediately after the June-July 1966 session of the People's Consultative Assembly which has again become Indonesia1s highest legislative body after a period of incapa city during the last years of the previous regime. During that session, it was decreed that "the problem of improving the peo p l e d economy must be given first priority amongst other nation al affairs, whilst the method of dealing with it needs to be based upon rational and realistic economic principles."8 The 6. Ibid., p . 347. 
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'Decontrol of prices. Introduced in October and follow ed up in February 1967, the measures were intended to eliminate price distortions through substantial increases in tariffs of public utility rates and transportation charges.
In order to evaluate the government's program, these four groups of policy measures will be discussed in detail in the following part.
Detailed Evaluation of the Program
The Central Government Budget
The chronic deficit in the government budget since 1951 has been widely identified as one of the most important forces generating the acceleration in the rate of inflation.
Its ef fect on the money supply is obvious as such deficits were mainly financed by the creation of new money. While the excess of government expenditure over revenue contributed to the increase in monetary demand, it exercised also the psychological effect of decreasing people's confidence in the currency. Table 3 shows that the deficit as a percentage of revenue continuously rose from 16.7 per cent in 1960 to 617.8 per cent in the first quarter of 1966 after which it declined. Expressed in 1960 prices, however, both expenditures and revenues showed a consistently declining trend until the first quarter of 1966. This decline was more pronounced when the budget is expressed as percentage of national income and more severe in the case of revenues than expenditures.
Thus while deficit financing under moderate inflationary conditions may increase the govern ment's claim on resources, under hyperinflation the real claim on resources declined. This occurred in spite of the enunciated policies of socialism and increased government participation in the economy. Under conditions of hyperinflation, large fortunes were amassed in the private sector and the deteriorating govern ment apparatus increasingly failed to adjust revenues to the changing conditions. The importance of a balanced budget was also recognized by the previous regime during its last days of power when the Government in December 1965 hastily prepared a budget of sorts which aimed at a balance through drastically raising the prices charged by public enterprises, gasoline and transportation in particular.
It envisaged among other things, a 100-fold increase in the revenues from petroleum pro ducts.
It was this budget, with the accompanying increases in prices, which precipitated political unrest and student demon strations leading to the downfall of the regime.10 The present Government is committed to a balanced budget policy by decisions of the Peoplers Congress of 196611 and on 24 December 1966, the parliament approved the 1967 budget which shows total receipts and expenditures to be balanced at Rp 81.3 billion. Thus total receipts in 1967 will be almost six times and total expenditures nearly three times those of 1966. As percentages of national income, both expenditures and revenues show significant gains (see Table 3 ). This budget, however, contains two items which virtually cancel each other: repay ment of foreign credits and rescheduling of repayment, in the amount of Rp 9 billion (the rupiah equivalent of U.S. $90 mil lion at the assumed exchange rate of Rp 100 to U.S. $1 used in the budget). The first major change from previous budgets is related to the complete overhaul of the foreign exchange system (See below). As shown in Table 4 , two major sources of revenue in 1967, i.e., profits from Bonus Exports (BE) exchange funds and rupiah pro ceeds from foreign credit BE sales, were nonexistent in 1966. Government foreign exchange funds, obtained through the sur render by exporters of part of their foreign exchange proceeds and through foreign credits, were not sold in 1966 but were allocated to the various government departments and holders of import licenses at low exchange rates. Now the proceeds from foreign credits and from exports are sold on the foreign ex change market created for that purpose. Thus the system of foreign exchange allocations to government departments has been abolished.
At the meetings with foreign creditors in Paris and
The resultant flexibility in revenues will automatically provide increases as the BE rate of exchange rises. Thus, a major portion of government revenues is isolated from the in flationary forces. The new system shows a weakness in that revenues are to a large extent determined by proceeds from the foreign sectors, i.e., trade and credits. Even though Indonesia managed to obtain the full $200 million credits anticipated in the budget for 1967, which should bring in at least Rp 20 bil lion in BE revenues, realization of such credits is expected to be not larger than $150 million, producing not more than The second important measure which characterizes the 1967 budget is the decree by the Government not to permit supple mentary budgets. This is an important decision, for in years past, Indonesian budgets were mere exercises on paper which were never adhered to. From 1961 to 1965, this situation be came steadily worse and in 1965 actual expenditures were 2 1/2 times those budgeted while revenues were only about 40 per cent higher than budgeted.
Because of the still large deficit in the last quarter of 1966 quarterly ceilings for fiscal opera tions were introduced in January 1967 and an attempt was made to balance the budget on a quarterly basis.
For the first quar ter of 1967, the expenditure level was set at only 10 per cent of total budget for the year, due to the seasonal character of revenue. Tables 1 and 2 . However, the strict enforcement of budgetary ceilings has seriously affected government departments, which also have suffered a loss of revenue from the restricted size of the development budget in 1967, partly because the Govern ment has decided not to start new projects. In the past many expenditures classified as development expenditures by the ministries were actually current expenditures which were in fact used to supplement the low wages of civil servants. These in cluded various imaginary research projects and surveys which were never carried out or inadequately carried out, and the establishment of committees and various projects to bolster the ministerial budget. Thus, while most criticisms have been directed against the various "show" projects of the past Presi dent, the real extent of waste of government funds for "develop ment" is much larger, as wasteful projects under the guise of, e.g., "research into potential riches of Indonesia's seas and natural wealth" existed in all departments.
This type of "development expenditure" has been severely curtailed in the present budget.
The large budget allocation for personnel expenditures and rice allowances reflects the overgrown bureaucracy inherited by the present Government. According to Department of the Budget figures, the total number of people on the Central Government payroll is 1.94 million, including 1.68 active employees and 260,000 pensioners.16 During the first part of 1967, heads of government departments and state enterprises were instructed by the Cabinet Presidium to ascertain the number of excess employees and to arrange for their transfer to other jobs within the Govern ment or, alternatively, make an effort to find employment for them in the private sector. During the transition period, such people would be placed on inactive status with pay during six months to two years. Re-employed pensioners, employees 55 years of age and over, and chronic absentees, however, are discharged without benefit of inactive status, but with severance pay for aged employees and chronic absentees. Employees discharged for superannuation will receive full salary for six months plus any long service leave payments to which they are entitled; chronic absentees will be paid for three months plus long service pay ments .
The above arrangements appear more benevolent than they are in reality.
Because of the inflation, salaries have been reduced considerably in real terms and most people are forced to accept 16. 522,000 were in the armed forces and 166,000 were civilians employed by the armed forces. Of the remaining, 406,000 were employed by the Central Government and the rest by regional authoritie s. employment with three or more companies.
Simultaneously, chronic absenteeism was, especially during the last regime, the norm rather than the exception.
In spite of the waves of salary increases, the latest in April 1967, in which allowances and salaries were increased by 50 per cent and rice allowances from 8 to 10 kilos monthly, salaries are still far below minimum requirements of employees.
Indeed, the initial successes of stabilization paradoxically caused more hardship for these fixed income groups in the short run. Under inflationary conditions, they were able to supple ment their incomes easily through speculative trading on the side, through selling on the market of rice and other rations, through corruption and through the various imaginary ' 'research and development" projects in their departments referred to above. Now, while their salaries have been raised and have become a little more meaningful through relatively more stable prices, these additional sources of income have virtually disappared. This brought about a number of unwanted consequences such as the increase in petty corruption and illegal ' 'taxes," an up surge in the wave of criminality especially in the larger cities, and an increase in smuggling which has now become semi legal in several regions, as regional authorities who feel the pinch of the tight budget policy think that they should them selves ' 'create" their own sources of revenue, causing danger to the national export target and government revenues from exports.
Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments
Reforms in the field of foreign trade and payments consti tute the second cluster of policies designed to stabilize the economy. The continuing and accelerating rate of inflation has undoubtedly had its adverse repercussions on the foreign trade and payments of Indonesia which in turn influenced the rate of inflation. While the excessive exchange restrictions encouraged capital flight, providing an added impetus to currency deprecia tion as a result of inflation and insecurity, nearly stagnant and even declining exports, coupled with stringent import con trol and restriction have in their turn again influenced the rate of inflation by disrupting the domestic flow of goods. These factors combined have caused a depreciation of the rupiah exchange rate exceeding the rate of inflation which in turn has induced more capital flight.
Since 1961, Indonesia's balance of payments has been in continuing deficit. The over-all payments deficit amounted to $161 million in 1961, decreased to $88 million in 1964 and rose again sharply to $235 million in 1965 when official loans and grants inflow declined sharply, as Table 6 shows, necessitating financing of the payments deficit through deferred payments and other short-term liabilities and by a rundown in foreign assets. It is expected that the agreements concluded in Scheveningen will considerably accelerate aid utilization.
Exports, which should be one of the important prime movers of development in developing countries everywhere, have been stagnant and have declined significantly in recent years, as shown in Table 7 .
The main factor preventing exports from increasing was the foreign exchange regulations whereby exporters received the major part of their earnings in rupiahs at official exchange rates which lagged far behind market rates. As the spread between the official rate and the free market rate became wider, the exporter was put increasingly at a disadvantage and un recorded exports increased. This in all its variations meant essentially the same thing: that the exporter was being taxed excessively.
In order not to stop exports altogether, various schemes have been devised to give exporters additional incentives. On 11 February 1966, the Bonus Export (BE) system was introduced. Under this system, exporters receive a portion of their earnings in the form of foreign exchange certificates called Bonus Export or BETs which they can sell on the free market or use to import commodities on the BE list. Exports were divided into three categories, i.e., This means an effective tax of M-5 per cent at the BE rate of 100 rupiahs per dollar. In order to provide additional incen tives to the exporters, the 3 October regulations retained the so-called checkprices for export commodities. These are prices below the world market prices on which basis the BE percentages are calculated. The premium above the checkprice, called over price retained by the exporter abroad, may be legalized and sold as Devisa Pelengkap (supplementary foreign exchange) or DP.
Formerly, foreign exchange resulting from overprice had to be kept secretly abroad by the exporter and constituted a capital flight which was semi-legal. The legalizing of such overprice proceeds was expected to bring back part of such DP exchange, and as shown on the balance of payments table for 1966 and 1967, this has occurred. Such DP exchange was not originally recorded as export proceeds, but is included in the capital inflow account. This is in conformity with the fact that proceeds from certain invisibles are also classified as DP exchange.
Another step towards trade liberalization was taken by the Government in the first quarter of 1967.
It involved the elimina tion of checkprices for category 3, weak exports. Thus, exporters of this group may officially keep all their foreign exchange or sell it as DP exchange. The total exports of this group amount to a mere $10 million or 2 per cent of total exports, but the move is significant as a test case to show how exports can be stepped up as a result of complete decontrol of the exchange system. On the import side, the 3 October regulations included sig nificant decontrol measures which transformed the BE system from a mere export incentive arrangement to an exchange certificate market with a freely fluctuating rate. Under the new system,
Laporan BNI Unit I kepada Presidium Kabinet Ampera, 30
January 1967 (Central Bank Report to the Cabinet Presidium; mimeographed, unpublished), p. 21.
imports for a wide range of essential commodities was made pos sible through the use of BE?s while imports for most other goods can be effected by buying D P Ts from exporters. At the same time, the regulations abolished the system of import allocations for government departments and privileged importers at widely varying exchange rates. Now imports by government departments have to be undertaken through the BE market while the government exchange fund is sold at BE rates approaching those on the free market. Thus, with a few exceptions, the 3 October measures were clearly meant to lead the way towards a unified exchange rate from the system of multiple exchange rates which had prevailed in the past.18
As an immediate result of these measures, the BE rate appre ciated from 120 rupiahs to 85 rupiahs per U.S. dollar. It re mained at that level until about mid-May 1967 when it started to depreciate again.
In mid-August, the BE rate on the free mar ket was around 143 while the DP rate was 160. The dollar on the free market was also commanding approximately 160 rupiahs. At that time, the Governments BE rate originating from foreign credits was 131 rupiahs per dollar. The close proximity of these rates, official and free market, is unusual and has not been experienced by Indonesia for many years.
The upsurge in the BE and DP rates which started in May 1967 were initiated in the private exchange market and were caused among other things by a temporary shortage of BE's as imports financed by BEfs on short-term credits had to be paid for. The government BE rate followed suit for different reasons. As the first quarter of the year still showed an inflation rate of around 35 per cent and the exchange rate did not depreciate accordingly, the move to depreciate the government BE rate was only meant as a corrective measure as many imported goods were cheaper than similar goods on the local market in the first quarter of 1967. Table 7 It is of interest to note that countries granting credits have supported Indonesiafs desire to put these credits and grants on sale in the market under the Bonus Export scheme outlined above. Under this system, credit BEfs are purchased at slightly below market rates by importers for import of goods under the BE list of essential commodities. Market forces are given free reign to allocate the commodities among various users, provided that export bonuses originating from credits of a partiuclar country will have to be spent in that country on raw materials and spare parts to rehabilitate industry. This has ended the allocation system of the previous regime and at the same time it provides the Government with a significant source of reve nue (see section on the budget). Meanwhile, credits from the Netherlands, Japan, India, West Germany and the United States have been put on the BE market with other countries to follow. The typing of credits by donor countries, coupled with the uni form BE rate applied to credits from all sources results in the fact that credit BEfs from some countries sell more readily than others.
In
Up to the end of September 1967, total sales of foreign credits on the BE system mounted to only $120 million. This falls considerably short of the targeted $200 aid utilization figure as indicated on the 1967 budget. Aid utilization will also depend on an improvement of the BE market which is expected to stem from the regulation introduced at the end of July 1967 whereby BE credit is made available at all state banks, not only at the Central Bank.
Obstacles of a more serious nature which impede effective utilization of aid are the considerable decline in domestic economic activity which has resulted from government stabiliza tion measures, and the government ban on credits for import purposes. The continued pressure on the Government against foreign competition has further tightened the measures against importers in the form of increased prepayment on imports from a previous range of 10 to 25 per cent to the present range of 25 to 50 per cent, causing a further strain on import financing. Accordingly, Indonesian importers were not able to place orders for goods on the credit BE list which they know very well they 
Credit Policies
Credit policies constitute the third important group of measures taken by the Government within the framework of its stabilization program.
It is also the policy which provokes most reactions, quite often unfavorable and in many cases un warranted, from the private as well as the public enterprise sector as they affect both sectors directly. The policy pur sued since 3 October 1966 has been labelled a "tight" money policy, although no ceiling is placed on the total outstanding credit of the banking system. What has happened is that a return is made to normal bank ing practices and banking policies from a period of chaos and absence of policy during the previous regime-absence of policy in the sense that a wide discrepancy existed between regulations and actual practice, between what was intended and what happened. In 1965, the banking structure underwent extensive reorganiza tion and the five state commercial banks were integrated into one bank on the same lines as that in the Soviet Union or China.
U.S. Embassy, Djakarta, Quarterly Economic Summary, 1st
quarter 1967, p. 7.
Ibid.
In February and March 1965, a new credit policy was introduced whereby credits extended by banks were to be based on antici pated results rather than on collateral. Banks were also in structed to allocate 60 per cent of new credit to state and co operative enterprises and 40 per cent to the private sector. These policy changes led to an upsurge in credit and credit in creased by 302 per cent during the year, over twice the increase in 1964.
Restrictive policies were attempted in January 1966 and in May 1966, but the inflationary forces during the period, coupled with the low interest rates charged by the state banks, caused credits to increase further and, by July, credits extended ex ceeded the ceiling for the full year.
Effective from 1 July 1966, the discount rate was raised and, including commissions to be paid, the cost of credit to the private sector fell to between the range of 26 and 53 per cent per annum. Allowing for a price rise of over 600 per cent in 1966, those fortunate enough to receive credits were there fore paying negative rates of interest and this in turn led to unwanted manipulations in which credits were granted according to the "below the counter" discount the customer was willing to accept. As a result, industries obtained credits far beyond their absorptive capacity and many industries which were oper ating at 30 per cent of capacity in 1965 obtained credits as if they had been operating at full capacity.
In addition, state enterprises could obtain "command credits" for which their credit worthiness was never questioned.
In such a situation, the most important element is the re organization of the banking system itself and the return to the banking system of its powers to regulate credit and to control its utlization.
These within one year, except credits for seasonal crops, while mediumterm credits were meant to be those repayable between one and three years.
Longer-terms credits in excess of specified limits laid down by the Central Bank were expressly forbidden. This stipulation mainly affected state enterprises which had in the past borrowed to finance taxes.
Furthermore, credits for the financing of imports were strictly forbidden.
Credits could only be granted to the following sectors (interest rates in parentheses):
1. Food production (6 per cent/month); 2. Export trade, production of export goods, textiles and other goods and transportation purposes (7 1/2 per cent/month);
Distribution of nine basic consumer goods and other sectors (9 per cent/month).
In addition, banks were instructed to ensure that 90 per cent of the new credits should go into activities under 1 and 2 above (production of essential goods, exports and transporta tion).
In granting credits, banks were instructed not to dis criminate between state and private enterprises while so-called T f command" credits (see above) to state enterprises were strictly forbidden. Regarding export credits, banks were asked to con firm the fact that the exporter was in actual possession of the goods to be exported and had already concluded export exchange contracts. All prefinancing of exports was forbidden while the permissible amount of credit for exports was limited to a maximum of 40 per cent of the value of the export exchange contract. As exporters were previously obtaining up to 100 per cent of their working capital through credits, the new measure was intended to force them to bring back their foreign exchange holdings from "over price" through the DP market. As such holdings could now be legalized and the exchange rate obtained was determined on the free market, capital inflow originating from DP exchange amounted to $41 million in 1966 and to $10 million in the first quarter of 1967.26
Under the new regulations, overdue credits bear a penalty rate of 50 per cent above the normal rates while overdrafts carry a penalty of 1 per cent per day. Overdrafts are inter preted as drawings above the ceiling granted; they were often used in the past to finance speculative trade.27 The Central Bank has been strictly implementing the above measures although the new regulations concerning overdue loans were not implemented 26. See Table 6 Realizing that production and exports were badly hurt by the too stringent measures taken, the Government gradually eased the tight money measures and credits in the second quarter of the year jumped again by 62.7 per cent with increasing shares going to the production and export sectors.
Interest rates were also lowered correspondingly and the latest revisions were effected on 1 July 1967.28
In accordance with these latest revisions, bank rates were lowered to between 3 and 5 per cent per month-three per cent for producers and distributors of nine essential commodities, agriculture, exports and the production of export commodities, transportation and certain other essential industries; four per cent/month for domestic trade and services, while other activ ities are to be charged 5 per cent. Furthermore, in order to facilitate exports, the maximum credits based on concluded con tracts was raised to 75 per cent of the value of the export stocks, while bona fide exporters who have continuously been in the export business for at least the last two years may draw credits not based on exchange contracts.
These credits may therefore be used for purchasing.
Several exceptions to the above provisions were made.
For fertilizers and pesticides, interest rates charged to farmers will be only 1 per cent per month, while public utility companies may obtain working capital credits for rehabilitation at 1 1 A per cent a month.
The new rates approximate those prevailing just before the 3 October 1966 measures were introduced. They have, however, been introduced in a climate quite different from that prevail ing at that time.
For one thing the rate of inflation has con siderably slowed down. Also, control has become much tighter with the re-organization of the banking system and the proportion 28. Business News, 19 June 1967. 
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of credits going to the production and export sector shown for 1967 are more meaningful than those for 1966 and earlier.
Decontrol of Prices
The fourth and last series of important measures taken within the framework of the stabilization program have been the attempts to eliminate price distortions resulting from infla tion and from a variety of controls in the past. While the main directive issued on 3 October 1966 contained instructions issued by the Presidium pertaining to prices charged by, and to government subsidies to the state enterprises,29 the political ly sensitive drastic increases in rates charged by public util ities and transportation companies did not take place until 10 February 1967. As stated earlier, a similar attempt by the previous Government to raise tariffs in consequence of its ill prepared balanced budget policy for 1966 precipitated major political disturbances which culminated in the downfall of that Government.
The decontrol of prices and the accompanying cessation of subsidies to state enterprises should bring about a substantial decrease in budget expenditures, while the increase in the price of gasoline and of other commodities will provide a significant contribution to revenue through increasing state enterprises profits.
It should be noted that, by January 1967, the quarterly rate of subsidies to state enterprises amounted to Rp 5.5 bil lion, or about 3 times total expenditures on salaries of civil servants.30 Prior to the February increases in public utility rates, prices charged by other state enterprises and private companies had been raised in conjunction with the new no-subsidy policy of the Government.
Thus, in November 1966, prices of basic commodities such as soap, shoes, margarine and sugar were increased by from 14 to 200 per cent. Ocean freight rates were trebled and international telecommunication rates were increased tenfold. The rate advances in February 1967 included increases in gasoline and kerosene prices of 700 and 500 per cent respec tively; electricity and water rates by 1,100 per cent; postal and domestic telegraph charges, by 1,600 per cent; railway pas senger fares, 400 per cent; and Djakarta bus fares, 200 per cent.
In order to soften the impact of these price increases, the Government continued to watch the movement of prices of nine 29. Presidium Kabinet Ampera, Instruksi No. 14, 3 October 1966. It had remained at that level for years, ignoring price inflation. At the then prevail ing black market rate of 50,000 old rupiah to the dollar, it means 0.008 U.S. cents per litre. At that time, the Government attempted to raise the price of gasoline by 250 times to 1,000 old rupiahs or to 1 new rupiah. The political unrest which fol lowed caused Government to reduce the price again to 50 cents (new currency).
Presidium Minister for Economic and Financial
In February 1967, the price was raised by 700 per cent to 4 new rupiahs.
Thus, since December 1965, the price was increased one thousand times. Yet, at the BE rate of 100 rupiahs per dollar, the gasoline price is still only 4 U.S. cents per litre.
Although it would be difficult to specify the details of an operationally meaningful system of interdependent prices, there is little doubt that cases of extreme distortion can be identi fied. When price control carries price distortions to the ex treme, as the Indonesian example indicates, public utility and other enterprises subject to such controls will be unable to cover overheads, let alone generate surpluses for rehabilitation of obsolete equipment. In 1965, even current expenditures could not be covered by receipts. As a result, all such enterprises had to resort to massive subsidies.
If such subsidies had been covered by taxes on the rich, we could state that a redistribu tion to the poor from the rich was taking place, which would have been beneficial from the standpoint of social welfare. This, however, was not the case under the particular conditions of hyperinflation which existed in Indonesia.
Subsidies under such circumstances only increased the budget deficit which accelerated the pace of inflation causing additional hardship to workers and other fixed income groups. Extremely low public utility rates meant no relief for the poor as such low tariffs provided the officials with an excuse to lower services to be low minimum standards.
Indeed it benefited the rich as they could, by adding Uunder the counter" payments, preempt whatever services were left or claim better services. This applied among others to transportation services, hospital services and to schools. Thus, under the circumstances of hyperinflation, what appeared to be a social welfare approach of holding rates and prices down to a minimum in fact benefited and subsidized the more well-to-do classes of the people.
It remains true nevertheless that the initial impact of such drastic price increases in transportation charges and public utilities will be felt more by the poor than by the rich. This situation can be alleviated by providing for progressive rates as have been introduced by the State electric companies. Progressive rates in this important public utility sector will lessen the burden of the lower classes. The same is true for transportation charges and the State Railway Company provides considerable reduction in the fares to school children and armed forces. Ultimately, price decontrol will benefit all users as services provided by those public enterprises may be expected to improve while they are able, through increasing revenues, to replace equipment from surpluses.
Rehabilitation of the Production Apparatus
While the four groups of policy measures discussed at length above were mainly directed towards the stabilization of the economy, they will also have direct or indirect impacts on the rehabilitation of production and therefore on economic develop ment.
Some of these effects will be favorable. Thus, the mea sures taken in the field of exports in line with the stabiliza tion program will at the same time be in conformity with the policy to rehabilitate export production. This is because the added incentive given to exporters in the form of larger per centages of foreign exchange immediately increased local prices of export products, giving further stimulus to producers of these goods.
On the other hand, credit policies, import liberalization and the balanced budget policy have all had unfavorable reper cussions on local industry. Import liberalization allowed for eign commodities to undersell the inefficiently manufactured local products.
For instance, while ample supplies of PL M-80 cotton began to arrive in January 1967, and the spinning mills were quite active, weaving mills operated well below capacity during the first quarter as costs were too high to compete with imported textiles.31 Other industries, such as the plastics 31. U.S. Embassy, Djakarta, Quarterly Economic Summary, first quarter 1967, p. 11. and match factories in Djakarta, called for a return to strict import control and the complete prohibition of imports of matchboxes and plastic goods.32 The tight implementation of a bal anced budget affected industries which were dependent on large government contracts, especially from the huge construction pro jects under the previous regime. Tight credits caused further hardship to local industry. Demands to relax present govern ment policies were therefore voiced especially from the indus trial sector, which, however, is still very small in Indonesia and has contributed only an estimated 11 to 13 per cent of national income in recent years.33
The Government is apparently placed in a dilemma. On the one hand, it is committed to continue its harsh stabilization measures and on the other, it is hard pressed to relax these measures in order to provide relief and protection to domestic industry. At present the Government has apparently decided to continue its efforts to ensure stabilization while at the same time relaxing certain restrictive measures and, for example, lowering interest rates.
Continuation of the strict policies is necessary.
In the first•instance, stability depends on the success of the balanced budget policy which in turn rests heavily on the current utilization of foreign aid and on the fulfillment of export targets.
In respect of credits, achievement of sta bility requires that credit expansion be used for productive purposes. Most importantly, the psychological forces by which inflation is fed cannot easily be eliminated, even if the monetary sources of the inflation have been brought under con trol. While it is difficult to judge the importance of such forces, a return to expansionary policies now may easily bring back the inflationary spiral with all its consequences.
In addition, too much protection to industry will not be beneficial in the long run. Domestic industry, especially state enterprises, received unusual protection in the past, one of the main causes of their inefficiency in operations. Industry during the last years of hyperinflation had already been oper ating only at between 15 and 30 per cent of capacity, and the present outcry against the harmful effects of government sta bilization policies needs further scrutiny. Unfortunately, statistics on industrial production are lacking and no definite conclusions can be drawn on the effects of government measures on industry.
As stated earlier, the highest legislative body has decided that stabilization and rehabilitation should take precedence over other matters.
In that program, checking inflation should re ceive first priority, to be followed by the four points in the rehabilitation program:
food production and supply, infra structure, increasing exports and supply of clothing.34
With regard to economic development, the cabinet has issued instructions to BAPPENAS, the State Planning Agency, to draw up a five-year economic rehabilitation and development plan which should start in January 1969, to follow the present sta bilization and rehabilitation program.35 The following sectors are to be given priority in the plan: agriculture, smallscale industry, mining, infrastructure and regional redistribu tion of population.
In addition, education and cultural develop ment are also to be given priority.
The success of the development plan, and of the rehabilita tion program, depends not only on the availability of funds but also, and perhaps more importantly, on such human factors as skills, management and organization of the production apparatus. Steps taken by the present Government to remove obstacles in these areas are partly related to the four sets of measures described earlier, as the following discussion will show.
If enterprises in the modern sector are classified accord ing to ownership, the following three sectors can be identified in Indonesia:
(1) Foreign enterprises: large-scale operations in mining, the manufacture of consumer goods and plantation agriculture.
(2) "Foreign domestic" enterprises: these are medium-and small-scale enterprises, mostly in the hands of for eign Chinese. Policies towards the first two sectors underwent a complete reversal. During the previous regime, opposition to foreign enterprises became in creasingly more apparent and the takeover and nationalization of such companies were gradually carried out, mainly as a consequence of the West Irian and Malaysia conflicts. On the other hand, the second sector which was mainly in the hands of citizens of the People's Republic of China, was rather favorably treated, the reason given being that such foreign "domestic" capital was progressive as capital and profits were not transferred, and 3*4. See first section above. In addition to the privileges granted to foreign investors, such as tax exemption up to five years from the start of production, exemption from import duties on capital equip ment, etc., compensation in the event of nationalization, and repatriation of profits, foreign investors are obliged to pro vide genuine opportunity for local capital participation follow ing a specified period.
Instruksi Presidium
The foreign owners receive full author ity to appoint their managers, provided that foreign personnel are appointed only to positions which cannot be filled by Indonesian nationals and that facilities for the training of Indonesians are established.
The last two provisions may somewhat diminish the attrac tiveness of investment opportunities for foreign capital and a large-scale inflow of such capital will probably not be the direct result of the new law. For one thing, other developing countries offer similar and in some cases more attractive terms, and some have a better record of political and economic stability. From the Indonesian standpoint, large-scale inflow of foreign capital is probably neither expected nor wanted, and joint ven tures are preferred.
Nevertheless, the prolonged insulation of Indonesia from foreign private capital may make it relatively more attractive to invest capital there than in similarly situated countries, while the abundance of unexploited natural resources provides another incentive.36 On the basis of preliminary enquiries by foreign firms, the Government expects an annual inflow of $100 million in direct foreign investments.37
Policy with regard to state enterprises has also undergone a fundamental change.
State enterprises, as stated earlier, con sist of large trading and manufacturing enterprises, banks, in surance firms and plantations taken over from Dutch interests in 1957 and from British and other interests during the course of confrontation with Malaysia.
It also includes new companies established by the Government in large-scale industry and in pub lic-utilities and transportation. The last one was established in June 1967 to manage the nearly completed Djatiluhur multi purpose dam.
Except for public utilities and transportation, state enter prises were expected to earn surpluses.
Their contribution to the state is to consist of a 50 per cent share in their profits and a donation of 55 per cent profits after tax to the develop ment fund. In return, they receive special treatment from the Government in the form of easy credit, foreign exchange alloca tions and monopolies in the trade and distribution of certain essential commodities.
They are intended to become training in stitutions for the development of a national entrepreneurial class while their status as state enterprises is expected to be in conformity with the principles of Indonesian socialism.
Since 1960, state enterprises have been grouped according to their type of activity and been formed into separate industrial organizations or perusahaan negara, each directed by a General Management Board (Badan Pimpinan Umum, BPU). These management boards were set up as co-ordinating bodies, but in reality they only formed part of the process of bureaucratization. The pres ent Government, in its attempt to reduce and streamline the bureaucracy has instructed that BPUTs which serve no useful pur pose be abolished. 
Summary and Conclusions
Thus far the most important achievement of the Government's stabilization and rehabilitation program has been the initial reduction in the rate of inflation. Undoubtedly, this achieve ment has been mainly due to the stringent balanced budget and tight money policies which have been applied vigorously since October, 1966. As a result, monetary expansion has slowed down considerably. Another factor, of perhaps equal importance is psychological; its effects can be seen indirectly in the statis tics on money supply and inflation. During the last quarter of 1966 and the first half of 1967, the rate of increase in the money supply has exceeded that of the price level. This appears to be a reversal of what had occurred since 1960.
It suggests at least a tentative restoration of confidence in the currency and in the Government. Although this qualitative element cannot be measured directly it is undoubtedly influenced by the earnest ness with which the Government is pursuing its stated purpose to ahieve stabilization.
The brief experience with stabilization policies suggests that both quantitative monetary action and propaganda to publicize the Government's intentions are required if confidence is to be restored.
The psychological element is also evident in the stabiliza tion of the exchange rate.
Stringent exchange controls aimed to stop the outflow of capital had in the past caused exactly the opposite to occur.
Fear of inconvertibility of the rupiah led to a considerable illegal capital outflow necessitating further tightening of controls which in turn induced more people to transfer their wealth abroad, depreciating the currency even further. The relaxation of controls, coupled with the increas ing share of foreign exchange earnings retained by exporters and the legalization of foreign exchange holdings, has led to a restoration of confidence and thus contributed in no small mea sure to the stabilization of the rupiah exchange rate. An assessment of qualitative elements which have contributed to the reduction in the rate of inflation should not overshadow the importance of quantitative stabilization measures. More over, psychological factors can work both ways and a reversal of policies at this stage may, through its psychological impact, bring back inflation in its full force. Nevertheless, some relaxation of the tight money policy may not be entirely pre cluded.
In the past, it was not only the increase in the volume of credit which was conducive to inflation, but also the actual use of credit since lack of control often permitted the diver sion of credits to unproductive uses. Thus an increase in the volume of credit, coupled with more stringent controls to ensure its productive use, should help alleviate the stagnation in both exports and industrial production.
The repercussions of the stabilization policies on economic activities were not unexpected. That the drastic reduction of the inflation rate produced unfavorable effects on certain activities came as no surprise.
Industries and trade geared to inflationary demand are particularly sensitive to stabilization. The repercussions, however, were not confined to these sectors alone and virtually all domestic industries complained about com petition from imports, tight money and a lack of effective de mand .
Extreme care should be exercised in the interpretation of such complaints.
In the period of strict import controls neces sitated by stagnant exports in the past, domestic industry had enjoyed extraordinary protection.
Protection came also in the form of easy credits at far below market rates of interest, and of import allocations for raw materials at low rates of exchange. As a result, credits and import allocations were diverted to other uses, while industry operated at 15 to 30 per cent of capacity. All these factors have recently came to light as de control measures were introduced and subsidies to state enter prises ceased.
In fact, the present policy whereby state enterprises are to compete on an equal basis with private enter prises may in the long run prove to be more in conformity with the purposes for which they were established, ..namely to provide an important source of revenues for the Government and to ful fil the objectives of Indonesian socialism. They may also be come, through competition, a training ground for a truly national entrepreneurial class.
In its policy of balancing the budget, the Government should consider the size of the budget in relation to national income. In the past inflation drastically reduced the Government claim on real resources. This is reflected in the low level of real income enjoyed by civil servants from their government jobs, making it necessary for them to search for supplementary sources. As stabilization has proceeded such sources, frequently in the form of petty speculative trading, will be eliminated while cur tailment of the government budget has liquidated income sources from makework research and other projects. A substantial in crease in government salaries should be preceded by a rationalization process and by an increase in government revenue. The excep tionally small proportion of taxes in relation to national in come suggests the existence of potentially large sources of government revenues.
These can again only be tapped after a reorganization of the tax system and a cessation of illegal "taxes' * which the majority of people are paying at present.
The $200 million balance of payments loan obtained for 1967 will contribute to the stabilization of the exchange and to the flow of goods. However, its utilization thus far has fallen short of expectations. Measures against importers in the form of cessation of credits and increased prepayments have, combined with general lack of effective demand and deter iorating distributive system, made it difficult for importers to increase import contracts, especially since foreign exchange from foreign credits can only be used for a limited number of goods obtainable only from the creditor country.
This may seriously hamper the flow of goods to the domestic market and will have adverse repercussions on the government budget. The Government may therefore be faced with a problem which is novel in Indonesia: the necessity to encourage imports.
One way to do so is, of course, by lowering the BE rate charged by the Government for foreign exchange obtained from external credits. This may have a beneficial effect on other BE rates, including that on exchange originating from private export earnings. Moreover, domestic producers will not be harmed by BE rates because credit BETs are to be used for spare parts and raw material imports.
Increased incentives to exporters seem to have partly offset tight credit and high interest charges, judging from the export performance in the first half of 1967.
If such performance continues, particularly after the new incentives introduced on 28 July 1967 the export target of $475 million (excluding oil) may well be achieved by the end of the year. It should nevertheless be recalled that exports have been quite stagnant for more than a decade.
Rapid economic growth cannot be achieved without a more-than-normal increase in exports to compensate for past stagnation.
Obstacles are many--adminis trative, physical and financial--all of which have contributed to smuggling and the decline of exports. The Government may remove the incentive to smuggle by giving adequate returns to the exporter. Administrative obstacles in the form of wide spread corruption in the ports, which results in excessive port costs, must be removed, physical obstacles will gradually be reduced with the rehabilitation of infrastructure. Unfor tunately this rehabilitation is proceeding slowly because of curtailment of the development budget. Although the develop ment budget is much smaller proportionally than in previous years, it puts emphasis on real development projects such as dredging, flood control, irrigation and highways, while un realistic development expenditures such as imaginary research projects have been abolished. It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that the improvements in the Indonesian economy achieved thus far will provide the basis for further improvements and help to provide the preconditions for rapid economic growth in the near future. Nevertheless, serious problems remain to be overcome. Those which have arisen from the painful adjustments necessary to com bat inflation and general economic deterioration should not pre vent the Government from carrying out its intentions. Meanwhile, the Government must build flexibility into its program, based on the experience gained in the course of implementation. Among the measures to combat inflation, psychological elements are perhaps as important as monetary factors.
In the long view, it is rapid economic development which is desired. Stabiliza tion and rehabilitation are only preliminary steps towards achieving this end.
Bangkok, October 1967

